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Throughout Western developed economies, females earn significantly less than their 
male counterparts.  In Australia the current female/male earnings ratio is 83.7 per cent, 
translating to a gender earnings gap of 16.3 per cent1.  Elsewhere (e.g. the UK and the 
US) the gap is much larger (Blau and Kahn, 1992).  
 
In an attempt to reduce the gender pay gap many governments have relied on 
legislative intervention.  Equal pay legislation, for example, was passed in the US in 
1963 and in Britain in 1970.   Australia, too, has sought to assist females via 
legislation.  In 1984 it introduced the Sex Discrimination Act and in 1986 the 
Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act.  These two Acts, 
however, have only had minimal effect on closing the Australian gap (Kidd and 
Meng, 1997).  Rather, the largest impact in Australia stems from the 1969 and 1972 
equal pay decisions of the federal industrial Commission (Short, 1986; Gregory and 
Duncan, 1981; Kidd and Meng, 1997).  Such outcomes are consistent with 
international literature which highlights the importance of institutions for female 
relative pay outcomes (Rubery, 1992; Whitehouse, 1992; Blau and Kahn, 1996). 
 
Since the early 1990s Australian institutional arrangements for pay determination and 
labour market regulation have undergone considerable change. In a series of 
legislative amendments governments of all persuasions have sought to decentralise the 
level of bargaining and circumscribe the role of unions and tribunals in the wage 
determination process.  While it is common to describe the processes in the various 
jurisdictions as 'enterprise bargaining', this label masks important differences in the 
institutional arrangements across Australia (Bennett, 1994). At one end of the 
spectrum there are regulatory systems based on individualism (e.g. Tasmania, Western 
Australia and Victoria). At the other end - at least prior to 1997 - there are collective 
                                                           
1  This figures is based on Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Average Weekly 
Earnings, States and Australia (Cat. No. 6302). The estimates are from seasonally adjusted 
average weekly ordinary time earnings for males and females employed full-time and pertain 
to May 1999.  
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systems such as those in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and 
federally.2 
 
It is widely predicted that women will be worse off in a less regulated environment.  
The literature on female pay suggests that "... women's pay position is influenced more 
by the overall system of pay determination than by the specific policies for gender 
equality." (Rubery, 1992: 619).  According to theory enterprise bargaining and labour 
market deregulation fails women because of their weaker bargaining power.  The 
latter arises as a result of their concentration in part-time and casual employment, 
lower status jobs and occupations and lower union membership (Robertson, 1992; 
Burgmann, 1994; and Sayers, 1999). 
 
Thus far the evidence as to the effect of labour market deregulation on gender equity 
has been mixed.  Content analysis of agreements generally shows that equal 
employment opportunity provisions have been weakened and that the beneficiaries of 
the new arrangements are managers rather than workers (e.g. Boreham, Hall, Harley 
and Whitehouse, 1997).  At an aggregate level, however, these changes have not 
adversely impacted on gender earnings. Although there has been a slight deterioration 
in female/male relative earnings since the regulatory reforms were first introduced, the 
change has not been statistically significant (Wooden, 1997). 
 
In this paper we study the effects of labour market reform on gender equity from a 
state perspective. That is, comparisons are made between states adopting 'radical' 
(individualist) reforms (notably Western Australia and Victoria) with states pursuing 
more moderate (collectivist) approaches (such as New South Wales, Queensland and 
South Australia).  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. We begin with a brief overview of the changes in 
the federal and state regulatory systems.  Thereafter the paper presents the research 
methodology and reviews the literature on gender earnings inequality. We follow this 
with a discussion of the data and presentation of results which test the hypothesis that 
                                                           
2  In November 1996 the Federal government introduced the Workplace Relations and 
Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996. This Act has an individualised ideological 
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labour market deregulation adversely impacts on gender earnings inequality. In the 
final part of the paper we offer a summary and some concluding remarks. 
 
 




In an overview of labour market deregulation in Australia Hancock (1999) observes 
that forces seeking to change the system of wage determination and labour market 
regulation first emerged in the late 1980s. The initial pressures for change were 
accommodated by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) in the form 
of a two-tier wage system providing for both national wage adjustments and 
productivity bargaining.  
 
In October 1991, under increasing pressure to further decentralise wage bargaining, 
the AIRC 'begrudgingly' introduced enterprise bargaining (Dabscheck, 1997). This did 
little to appease the key players (notably the Australian Labor Party (ALP), Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Business Council of Australia (BCA)) who 
had a common objective of overturning the traditional system of arbitration (Hancock, 
1999).  Accordingly, in 1992 the government (ALP) amended the Industrial Relations 
Act 1988 and introduced a new division (3A) on certified agreements. Following re-
election, more substantial changes were made via the Industrial Relations Reform Act 
1993 (which came into effect in early 1994).  Under this Act collective bargaining was 
given priority and awards were relegated to the role of 'safety net'. Awards thus 
became the basis against which the no-disadvantage test was conducted and the main 
source of wage adjustments for those not in the enterprise stream.  
 
The 1993 Act also permitted, for the first time, agreements to be made directly 
between employers and employees. Such agreements were intended for enterprises 
with no or few union members.  There were some conditions attached. For example, a 
majority of employees had to genuinely agree to be bound by the agreement. The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
underpinning. 
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AIRC could refuse to approve an agreement if an employer had not notified unions 
respondent to the relevant award with members at the enterprise of negotiations. 
Finally, unions party to the award had to the right to be heard when the application for 
approval went before the Commission. 
 
In 1996 the ALP lost power to the Howard Coalition Government. On election to 
office the Howard Government immediately began drafting new industrial relations 
legislation designed to further facilitate direct (employer-employee) bargaining.  
Following the passage of their Bill the Industrial Relations Act 1988 was changed to 
the Workplace Relations Act 1996, which as Hancock (1999: 47) notes, "announces 
the legislature's preferences for employer-employee relations to be decided at the 
workplace with minimum third-party involvement". Further regulatory reforms aimed 
at promoting direct bargaining are currently before the federal parliament in the form 






Since 1992 changes in the institutional arrangements for pay determination have also 
occurred at the state level. However, there are notable state differences in the nature of 
the reforms introduced (Bennett, 1994). At one end of the spectrum there are 
regulatory systems based on individualism (e.g. Tasmania, Western Australia and 
Victoria). At the other end there are collective systems such as those found in New 
South Wales and, prior to 1997, Queensland and South Australia too.  
 
In Victoria legislation was introduced in 1992 (Employee Relations (ER) Act 1992) to 
encourage and promote non-union bargaining. As part of the shift to non-union 
bargaining the ER Act abolished state awards and replaced them with a set of 
'minimum conditions'. In 1996 the Victoria government ceded its industrial powers to 
the Commonwealth via the Commonwealth Powers (Industrial Relations) Act 1996 
(see Kollmorgen, 1997, for more details). 
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In Western Australia the main reforms to the industrial relations legislation were made 
in December 1993 via three new acts: the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1993 
(WA), the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA) and the Workplace 
Agreements Act 1993 (WAA).  Under the WAA employers may opt to enter into non-
union individual agreements. Agreements made under this Act are approved by the 
WA Commissioner of Workplace Agreements (as compared to the WA Industrial 
Relations Commission were union agreements are sent for ratification). The no 
disadvantage test against which WA non-union agreements are assessed is the 
Minimum Conditions of Employment Act. When compared to awards and minimums 
in the federal jurisdictions, the WA minimums are meagre. The WA minimum wage - 
which is prescribed by the Minister for Labour Relations - is, for example, well below 
the single minimum maintained by the AIRC (Hancock, 1999: 85).3 
 
In Tasmania reforms introduced since 1993 provide for non-union agreements. Other 
changes include the abolition of preference and closed shop practices and restricted 
rights of entry for union officials (Otlowski, 1994).  Agreements made in the 
Tasmanian jurisdiction are registered with the Enterprise Commissioner. As in WA 
there is a set of legislated (low) minimums against which agreements must comply. 
 
As compared to Victoria, Western Australia and Tasmania, the regulatory 
arrangements in the remaining Australia states are 'collectivist'.  In Queensland and 
South Australia the provisions have essentially mirrored those federally.  In 
Queensland the 'harmonising' was achieved via an amendment to the Act in 1994 
designed to bring the Queensland and federal systems into alignment (Coulthard, 
1998).  In South Australia, since 1994, non-union bargaining is provided for, but 
approval of such agreements rests with the state Commission (Alexander and Lewer, 
1998). In New South Wales non-union bargaining is not provided for. In other words 
arbitration tribunals and unions continue to play an important role in shaping the wage 
outcomes in the NSW system (Gardner and Palmer, 1997). 
 
 
                                                           
3  For more on the WA arrangements refer to Ford (1996), Bailey and McAtee (1999) 
and Bailey and Horstman (1999). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In economic studies of wage determination two procedures may be used to examine 
the impact of discrimination on gender wage inequality. The simplest is to include a 
female dummy variable in a pooled wage equation.  The level of wage discrimination 
may be measured by the coefficient on the female dummy variable.  A more 
sophisticated approach involves the estimation of separate male and female wage 
equations controlling for a range of productivity related characteristics such as 
experience, skills, occupation and industry of employment.  A subsequent 
decomposition of the observed differences in average male and female wages into 
explained and unexplained components provides insight into the determinants of the 
difference (see Blinder, 1973; and Oaxaca, 1973).  The decomposition procedure may 
be summarised  as follows. 
 
Firstly two separate wage equations of the form ln   Y Vim m im m= +β β0  and 
ln   Y Vif f if f= +β β0  are estimated for males (m) and females (f), respectively.  
Adopting the male wage structure as the non-discriminatory norm the raw wage gap 
can be decomposed using the following procedure: 4 
 
ln ln ( )  (   ) (   )Y Y V V Vm f m f m f m f m f− = − + − + −β β β β β0 0    (1) 
 
where m denotes the males, f denotes females, V is a vector of the means of the 
independent variables and β  is a vector of estimated slope coefficients.  The first term 
of the decomposition calculates the portion of the gap attributable to differences in the 
characteristics of males and females. For example, if X  denotes potential labour 
market experience then the difference in the average labour market experience of 
males and females would be )( fm XX − .  To value this experience difference we 
multiply it with the male experience coefficient from the regression equation ( mXβ̂ ).  
This procedure is undertaken for each characteristic controlled for in the regression 
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equation (e.g. education level, sector of employment, birthplace, industry and 
occupation of employment).  The explained portion, the first term of equation (1), is 
the summation of all characteristic differences valued at corresponding male rates. 
 
The second term of equation (1) calculates differences in male-female returns to these 
characteristics. In other words, it measures the extent to which the market values the 
same characteristic differently for males and females. The third term represents 
differences in the constants ( β 0 ).  Together the last two terms can be seen as 
providing an indicator of the extent to which female skills are unexplained or 
undervalued (i.e. the portion of the gap attributable to equal pay factors).5 
 
Most Australian studies utilising the decomposition procedure outlined above find 
that less than a quarter of the gender wage gap arises because of differences in the 
endowments (characteristics) of males and females.  The corollary of this is that 
around three quarters of the gap may be attributed to the undervaluation of female 
skills (see column (iv) in Table 1 below).  
 
Differences in samples, time-frames and model specifications make it difficult to 
state, precisely, the extent to which females are disadvantaged in the Australian labour 
market.  Estimates based on data from the 1990s range from around 8 per cent 
(Reiman, 1998) to 14.5 per cent (Preston, 1997).  These estimates are consistent with 
studies using the dummy variable approach (e.g. Rummery, 1992; and Chang and 
Miller, 1996). 
 
When compared with estimates based on data from earlier periods it is apparent that 
the gender wage gap in Australia has been falling.  The largest convergence, as noted 
earlier, occurred in the 1970s following the removal of institutionalised gender wage 
discrimination in the equal pay decisions of 1969 and 1979 (Spilsbury and Kidd, 
1996; Gregory and Ho, 1985; and Mitchell, 1983).  Estimates from Miller (1994) 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4  If the female wage structure is taken as the non-discriminatory norm the explained 
portion is  equal to ( ) V Vm f f− β , and the unexplained portion is equal to Vm m f(   )β β− . 
5  It should be acknowledged that a portion of this gap may also reflect data-deficiencies 
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show that in 1973 the adjusted wage gap was equal to around 40.8 per cent. By 
1989/90 the corresponding gap was 12.7 per cent.6 
 
Table 1 Decomposing the Australian Gender Wage Gap. 
Study, year of data and decomposition 














 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Miller (1994): 1973 data. 0.468 0.408 13 87 
Chapman and Mulvey (1986): 1982 data. 0.167 0.132 21 79 
Kidd and Viney (1991): 1982 data. 0.208 0.173 17 83 
Rummery (1992): 1984 data. 0.146 0.104 29 71 
Miller (1994): 1989 data . 0.143 0.127 12 88 
Langford (1995): 1989-90 data. 0.150 0.092 39 61 
Kidd and Shannon (1996): 1989-90 data. 0.144 0.099 30 70 
Preston (1997):  
• 1981 data 













Preston (1999): 1991 data. 
• private sector male/female wage gap 













Reiman (1998): 1995 data. 
• all employees 
• employees engaged in enterprise 
bargaining 



























(a) With the exception of Preston (1997 and 1999) all other studies use hourly earnings as their dependent variable.  Preston uses 
weekly earnings. 
(b) In Miller (1994) the sample is restricted to 30-64 year olds. The remaining studies in Table 1 draw their samples from the 
total working age population (in some cases defined as 18-64, in others defined as 15-64). 
(c) In Kidd and Shannon (1996) the model includes controls for occupation and industry.  Other studies listed in Table 1 which 
control for occupation and industry include Kidd and Viney (1991), Chapman and Mulvey (1986),  Langford (1995), Preston 
(1997 and 1999), and Reiman (1998).  Miller (1994) controls for occupation (but not industry). 
(d) Reiman (1998) uses the employee survey from the 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS95) 
where it is possible to link individual data with workplace records.  The model estimated here is thus of a very detailed nature 
(consisting of 61 variables). These include controls for human capital characteristics as well as a range of workplace factors 
(these include union membership, nature of competition in product market, ownership (Australian/overseas), and whether or not 
the firm  made a profit or broke even last year). 
 
The gap also narrowed over the 1980s, although at a much slower rate.  In 1981, for 
example, the adjusted wage gap was equal to 20.8 per cent.  By 1991 it had fallen to 
15.1 per cent (see Preston, 1997).7  The convergence noted here may be attribute it to 
improvements in female labour market experience over the period; changes in 
                                                           
6  The Australian experience of a rapid decline in the gender earnings differential 
following institutional intervention is not unique.  The UK similarly experienced a remarkably 
increase in female relative earnings following the introduction of equal pay legislation in the 
1970s (Gregory, Daly and Ho (1986).  In the US the various pieces of legislation introduced to 
remove discrimination (e.g. Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Civil Rights Act of 1964) only had 
minimal effect, essentially because of the lack of supporting institutional structures (Gregory 
and Ho, 1985).  The conclusion thus arrived at is that institutions matter in the determination 
of female pay. 
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experience helped reduced the gender earnings gap by about one quarter (Kidd and 
Meng, 1997; and Preston, 1997). Since 1991 there has been no significant change in 
the gender earnings gap at a national level (Wooden,1997).  In the following section 
we examine the Australian data at a disaggregated state level. 
 
DISAGGREGATED STATE ANALYSIS 
 
We commence this section with the presentation of Figure 1 showing the within state 
gender pay gaps over the period 1991 to 1999. The ratios are derived from ABS data 
on average weekly ordinary time earnings (i.e. they do not include overtime earnings). 




Over the period August 1991 to May 1999 there was no significant change in the 
gender wage gaps of New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (Vic), Queensland (QLD) 
and Tasmania (Tas).  In Western Australia (WA) the gap widened by 4.4 percentage 
points (to 22 per cent). In South Australia (SA) the equivalent change was 5.8 
percentage points (to 16.1 per cent).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7  The same model specification was used in both periods. 
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The Victorian and Tasmanian results are at odds with expectations (the hypothesis 
being that gender wage inequality will be higher in more deregulatory systems). 
However, Preston and Crockett (1999) show that relative to males and females 
nationally, the earnings of males and females in Victoria and Tasmania declined 
significantly over the 1990s - thus explaining the insignificant overall net gender 
effect. 
 
The differentials shown in figure 1 are, however, only 'raw' differentials. As indicated 
above, any attempt to explain the pay gap between males and females needs to try and 
account for factors important in why individuals earn different amounts. That is, some 
effort should be made to control for differences in education, qualifications, skills, 
experience and demographic characteristics known to be important determinants of 
earnings.  The following results from Preston and Crockett (1999) show the state 
gender pay gaps after adjusting for differences in observed characteristics. 
 
Table 2 Decomposing Australian State Gender Earnings Gaps, 1996 
 Australia NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS
Total Gap 0.192 0.183 0.176 0.214 0.172 0.261 0.178
Explained Gap 0.051 0.050 0.041 0.063 0.013 0.085 0.006
Unexplained Gap 0.141 0.133 0.135 0.151 0.159 0.176 0.171
Source: Crockett and Preston (1999, Table 2). 
 
The last row of Table 2 measures the adjusted gender earnings gap in each state. 
When compared with NSW (a collectivist system), the adjusted gaps in WA and 
Tasmania (individualist systems) are significantly higher.  In the following section we 
combine 1991 and 1996 data to provide more insight in the sources contributing to 
changes in the wage structure within the various states. 
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The data are drawn from the 1991 and 1996 Census Household Sample Files (HSFs) 
which contain a one per cent sample of the population.  In keeping with most studies 
in this area our samples are restricted to full-time wage and salary earners aged 
between 16 and 64 years.8 (Appendix A provides details on the data and variables 
used.) In the 1996 sample there are 26,370 males and 14,059 females.  In the 1991 
sample the corresponding sample sizes are 21,776 and 11,609.  
 
The dependent variable in all cases is the natural logarithm of weekly earnings (lnY).  
This variable picks up the weekly earnings from all sources (including overtime, 
allowances, interest etc.). The income data are grouped, thus the midpoints of each 
interval are used to estimate weekly earnings.9  Following Chiswick and Miller (1995) 
the open-ended upper limit is given a value of 1.5 times the lower threshold level. 
 
The estimation technique is ordinary least squares (OLS).  Amongst other things, this 
procedure assumes that the population disturbances are distributed with constant 
variance.  A violation of this assumption means that OLS is no longer efficient and 
that the OLS estimator of the variance of the slope coefficients is biased and 
inconsistent. Standard errors may, consequently, be too large or too small, thus 
affecting the construction of confidence intervals for the testing of hypotheses. In the 
analysis below the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test is used to detect whether or not 
heteroskedasticity is present.  Where it is detected White's technique (White, 1980) is 
used to minimise the adverse consequences noted above.  The technique provides a 
consistent estimates of the standard errors, and thus reliable (although unnecessarily 
large) confidence intervals.  
                                                           
8  Full-timers are defined as those working 35 or more hours per week in their main job. 
Our rationale for restricting the sample to full-time wage and salary earners is to overcome 
some of the estimation difficulties associated with measuring the labour market experience of 
persons employed part-time.   
9  Although the Census data also contains information on hours worked these data are 
also grouped.  Rather than introduce further biases into the data (by dividing one grouped 
variable with another grouped variable) we choose, instead, to work with weekly income data 
and control for hours worked in the regression. 






The one period Blinder/Oaxaca decomposition technique summarised at equation (1) 
above may be extended following Wellington (1993) to allow for a study of the 
determinants of change over time. 
 











where the subscripts 96 and 91 refer, respectively, to two different time periods, 1996 
and 1991. 
 
The terms on the left-hand side measure the change in the raw wage gap over the 
period 1991 to 1996.  The first term on the right-hand side measures the portion of 
this change in the raw wage gap which may be explained by changes in the 
endowments of males and females over the period.  (The decomposition method 
proposed values such changes at 1996 levels).  The second term on the right-hand side 
measures the portion of the change in the raw wage gap which cannot be explained by 
differences in the measured endowments between the two groups.  Also included in 
this component are changes in the constant term.  This evaluation holds the group’s 
1991 means (endowments) constant.  The measured change is thus associated with a 
change in the way these characteristics are rewarded (paid for) over the period 1991 to 
1996. 
 
The results associated with the Wellington decomposition are presented in Table 3 
below. (The regression results used to derive Table 3 are presented in Appendix B).  
Due to coding constraints the following analysis excludes Tasmania and restricts the 
analysis of South Australia and Western Australia to the capital cities of Adelaide and 
Perth.10,11 
                                                           
10  In the 1991 Census Household Sample File Tasmania was grouped with the 
Australian Capital Territory.  The non-metropolitan areas of South Australia and Western 
 14  
 
 
Table 3: 1991 to 1996 Changing Gender Earning Gaps 
  NSW VIC QLD ADEL PERTH 
Change Gender Gap to Explain -1.288 0.176 0.056 -2.808 1.113
Explained Portion  -0.661 -1.688 0.148 -2.599 -0.099
Unexplained Portion -0.627 1.864 -0.092 -0.209 1.212
Source: 1991 and 1996 Census HSFs 
 
The last row of Table 3 shows that between the two Census periods (1991 and 1996) 
the gender earnings gaps in NSW, QLD and Adelaide experienced some convergence 
as a result of changes in the way female characteristics were paid for relative to men.  
In Victoria and Perth, between 1991 and 1996, there was a change in the way 
characteristics were paid for - with the change favouring males. In both Victoria and 
Perth females improved their average (earning) characteristics (e.g. human capital 
endowments) relative to men thus helping to narrow the pay gap. However, the gains 
made here were not enough to offset the adverse change in the remuneration structure, 
as discussed above.  When compared to the 'collectivist' system of NSW, the 
unexplained changes in the Victorian and Perth wage structures are significant at the 
10 and 20 per cent levels, respectively.  The Victorian and Perth results, thus, lend 
support to the hypothesis that labour market deregulation adversely impacts on gender 
earnings inequality.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Australia were grouped together with the Northern Territory . These coding arrangements 
make it impossible to separately identify Tasmania, Western Australia and South Australia. 
11  In restricting the WA and SA analysis to the capital cities it is possible that we may 
understate the movement in the gap in these states.  A one period analysis (1996) shows that 
in Perth, for example, the raw gender wage gap is equal to 23.5 per cent (as compared to a 
gap of 26.1 per cent for WA). Similarly, the Perth and WA adjusted gender wage gaps are 
equal to 16.2 and 17.6 per cent, respectively. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Since 1991 Australian institutional arrangements for pay determination at both state 
and federal levels have undergone a number of transformations. In a series of 
legislative amendments governments of all persuasions have sought to decentralise 
wage bargaining.  While it is common to describe the processes in the various 
jurisdictions as 'enterprise bargaining', this label masks important differences in the 
institutional arrangements across Australia (Bennett, 1994). At one end of the 
spectrum there are the regulatory systems based on individualism (e.g. Victoria and 
Western Australia). At the other end there are the collectivist systems (e.g. New South 
Wales).   
 
It was widely predicted that enterprise bargaining and labour market deregulation 
would cause a deterioration in the gender pay gap.  Nationally such a deterioration has 
not yet eventuated. Females continue to earn around 86 per cent of male average 
earnings after adjustments have been made for differences in their productivity 
characteristics.   
 
At the state level there are, however, differences in the size of the gender pay gap and 
the factors contributing to changes observed.  Australian Census sample data for 1996 
shows that NSW has the lowest adjusted gender wage gap (equal to 13.3 per cent) and 
Western Australia the highest (equal to 17.6 per cent).  The results in this paper also 
show that in all states, except Queensland, females improved their relative 
productivity characteristics over the period 1991 to 1996, thus helping to reduce the 
gender pay gap. However, in Victoria and Western Australia (Perth) the relative 
productivity improvements (and thus convergence in the gap) were washed away by a 
shift (in favour of males) in the way the characteristics were rewarded (i.e paid for). It 
is notable that of the states studied in this paper Victoria and Western Australia are the 
only two which have an industrial relations system based on an ideology of 
individualism rather than collectivism. 
 
From a policy perspective the results are consistent with Rubery's observation that "... 
women's pay position is influenced more by the overall system of pay determination 
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than by the specific policies for gender equality" (1992: 619). Convergence in the 
gender pay gap requires changes in equal opportunity factors (e.g. training, 
experience) as well as equal pay factors. It would appear that equal opportunity 
provisions are contributing to convergence in gender earnings (as reflected in a 
narrowing of the explained gap in Table 3). Equal opportunity, on its own, is not 
enough. Removal of the gender pay gap also requires that males and females are 
equally remunerated for their productivity characteristics. Decentralised bargaining 
weakens the capacity for institutions such as tribunals and unions to bring about the 
attainment of equal pay.   
 
Since 1996 all jurisdictions, except NSW, have moved further down the deregulatory 
path.  If the results of this paper are correct, then one might predict that the future will 
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
 
Variable label Variable Description 
Dependent Variable  
(lnY) 
Natural logarithm of weekly earnings (where earnings are defined as 
earnings from all sources). 
Independent Variables  
Education (highest qualification) 
high school (omitted group) 









person works 41 or more hours per week  
(otime=1 ; else otime=0) 
Demographic Characteristics 
Australia born in Australia (omitted group) 
esb born English-speaking country 
nesb born in a non-English-speaking country 
single person never married (omitted group) 
married person married 
wsd person widowed, separated or divorced 
child person has dependant children (child=1; else child=0) 
Sector of employment 
govt 
person employed in the public sector (govt=1; else govt=0) 


















Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, Gas and Water. 
Construction. 
Wholesale Trade (omitted group) 
Retail Trade. 
Transport and Storage. 
Communication Services. 
Finance and Insurance 
Property and Business Services. 
Public Administration and Defence. 
Education. 
Health and Welfare 
Entertainment and Recreation Services. 
Personal and Other Community Services.  













Advanced Clerical & Service Workers (omitted group) 
Intermediate Clerical, Sales and Service Workers 
Intermediate Plant Operators 
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APPENDIX B: REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
NSW - MALES - 1996  NSW MALES - 1991  
Mean of ln(Y) 6.490 Mean of ln(Y) 6.311 
Adjusted R2 0.429 Adjusted R2 0.551 
Number of 
Observations 
9064 Number of 
Observations 
7543 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X 
--------- ------------- ---------- ------------ --------- ------------- ---------- ------------ 
constant 5.689 104.905 constant 5.610 185.235 
hschool 0.049 3.242 0.290 hschool 0.044 3.538 0.318
cert 0.136 9.009 0.344 cert 0.163 13.079 0.321
diploma 0.183 6.008 0.031 diploma 0.272 9.872 0.032
degree 0.369 17.724 0.188 degree 0.388 19.644 0.136
exp 0.031 18.394 19.768 exp 0.035 24.021 18.820
expsq -0.001 -15.036 529.890 expsq -0.001 -20.432 501.200
otime 0.188 20.598 0.497 otime 0.174 19.946 0.370
esb 0.045 2.774 0.091 esb 0.055 4.159 0.101
nesb -0.104 -8.167 0.174 nesb -0.071 -6.137 0.159
married 0.100 7.498 0.600 married 0.119 10.265 0.589
wsd 0.040 2.139 0.087 wsd 0.073 4.476 0.080
child -0.013 -1.109 0.349 child 0.005 0.522 0.388
govt 0.097 6.091 0.197 govt 0.037 2.796 0.285
metro 0.130 10.445 0.840 metro 0.112 11.477 0.811
affh -0.351 -8.917 0.029 affh -0.280 -7.665 0.026
mining 0.536 14.291 0.018 mining 0.448 16.730 0.026
manufact -0.001 -0.065 0.180 manufact -0.002 -0.145 0.206
elecgw 0.047 1.625 0.015 elecgw 0.006 0.243 0.034
constrn -0.031 -1.524 0.101 constrn 0.041 2.070 0.080
rt -0.209 -10.219 0.100 rt -0.150 -8.005 0.094
rest -0.184 -6.306 0.033 rest -0.186 -6.510 0.028
transtre 0.024 0.978 0.063 transtre 0.023 1.154 0.070
communic 0.097 3.554 0.029 communic -0.024 -0.934 0.028
fin 0.223 8.075 0.045 fin 0.146 5.895 0.052
pbs -0.029 -1.348 0.104 pbs 0.065 2.753 0.060
pad -0.079 -3.267 0.058 pad -0.023 -1.059 0.078
ed -0.217 -7.816 0.045 ed -0.151 -5.677 0.047
hellwel -0.096 -3.042 0.040 hellwel -0.184 -6.202 0.038
ent -0.062 -1.650 0.019 ent -0.094 -2.039 0.012
pos -0.128 -3.936 0.031 pos 0.010 0.399 0.035
mgr 0.330 6.367 0.148 mgr 0.284 11.856 0.127
prof 0.291 5.627 0.143 prof 0.155 6.572 0.107
aspro 0.220 4.304 0.132 aspro 0.089 3.986 0.113
trade 0.008 0.168 0.218 trade -0.094 -4.365 0.232
icssw 0.073 1.426 0.095 icssw 0.022 0.952 0.111
iptw -0.026 -0.503 0.133 iptw -0.116 -5.062 0.111
ecssw -0.035 -0.638 0.033 ecssw -0.099 -3.249 0.019
lrw -0.061 -1.185 0.089 lrw -0.169 -7.706 0.149
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NSW - FEMALES 1996 NSW FEMALES - 1991 
Mean of ln(Y) 6.307 Mean of ln(Y) 6.115 
Adjusted R2 0.405 Adjusted R2 0.469 
Number of 
Observations 
4905 Number of 
Observations 
3941 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X 
--------- ------------- ---------- ------------ --------- ------------- ---------- ------------ 
constant 5.756 157.547 constant 5.615 183.265 
hschool 0.053 3.012 0.345 hschool 0.058 3.690 0.371
cert 0.129 6.322 0.162 cert 0.117 6.240 0.160
diploma 0.196 6.792 0.072 diploma 0.238 8.879 0.102
degree 0.336 14.090 0.249 degree 0.352 15.184 0.161
exp 0.035 17.103 17.865 exp 0.036 18.525 16.375
expsq -0.001 -13.705 455.870 expsq -0.001 -15.156 404.550
otime 0.110 8.607 0.315 otime 0.128 8.963 0.202
esb 0.030 1.496 0.086 esb 0.034 2.149 0.116
nesb -0.091 -6.270 0.182 nesb -0.045 -2.952 0.155
married -0.003 -0.211 0.476 married 0.025 1.920 0.487
wsd 0.033 1.869 0.145 wsd 0.040 2.237 0.119
child -0.062 -4.161 0.230 child -0.076 -5.758 0.278
govt 0.084 5.410 0.262 govt 0.038 2.500 0.302
metro 0.143 8.742 0.859 metro 0.083 6.143 0.838
affh -0.470 -5.066 0.012 affh -0.452 -5.482 0.010
mining 0.223 2.705 0.001 mining 0.266 3.469 0.002
manufact -0.058 -2.325 0.110 manufact -0.010 -0.422 0.121
elecgw 0.004 0.080 0.006 elecgw 0.085 1.253 0.005
constrn -0.136 -2.755 0.014 constrn -0.100 -1.529 0.013
rt -0.187 -6.711 0.105 rt -0.175 -6.980 0.110
rest -0.200 -5.677 0.035 rest -0.091 -2.688 0.031
transtre -0.008 -0.228 0.030 transtre 0.012 0.396 0.033
communic 0.097 2.656 0.021 communic -0.033 -0.748 0.015
fin 0.077 3.154 0.084 fin 0.065 2.788 0.108
pbs -0.006 -0.254 0.132 pbs 0.023 0.860 0.094
pad -0.049 -1.534 0.056 pad -0.036 -1.230 0.061
ed -0.176 -6.286 0.114 ed -0.101 -3.822 0.110
hellwel -0.162 -6.391 0.160 hellwel -0.043 -1.632 0.170
ent -0.048 -1.241 0.024 ent -0.142 -2.262 0.011
pos -0.131 -3.695 0.038 pos -0.084 -2.405 0.043
mgr 0.281 9.294 0.076 mgr 0.288 10.964 0.065
prof 0.186 7.694 0.259 prof 0.158 7.533 0.217
aspro 0.093 3.814 0.118 aspro 0.117 5.033 0.075
trade -0.189 -4.911 0.030 trade -0.205 -5.692 0.034
icssw -0.053 -2.755 0.252 icssw -0.001 -0.075 0.215
iptw -0.183 -5.937 0.031 iptw -0.178 -6.711 0.033
ecssw -0.094 -3.334 0.072 ecssw -0.101 -5.595 0.117
lrw -0.188 -7.138 0.060 lrw -0.199 -8.441 0.079
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VIC - MALES - 1996  VIC - MALES 1991  
Mean of ln(Y) 6.450 Mean of ln(Y) 6.286 
Adjusted R2 0.422 Adjusted R2 0.511 
Number of 
Observations 
6472 Number of 
Observations 
5475 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X 
--------- ------------- ---------- ------------ --------- ------------- ---------- ------------ 
constant 5.637 110.562 constant 5.700 157.689 
hschool 0.074 4.154 0.345 hschool 0.051 3.566 0.352
cert 0.163 8.929 0.305 cert 0.166 10.998 0.284
diploma 0.270 7.512 0.032 diploma 0.252 9.009 0.039
degree 0.398 16.557 0.188 degree 0.361 16.526 0.153
exp 0.033 16.787 19.405 exp 0.035 20.844 18.338
expsq -0.001 -13.714 508.290 expsq -0.001 -17.617 482.890
otime 0.157 14.768 0.501 otime 0.151 14.171 0.369
esb 0.039 2.079 0.085 esb 0.013 0.813 0.099
nesb -0.122 -8.245 0.178 nesb -0.085 -6.564 0.172
married 0.090 5.581 0.611 married 0.073 5.542 0.610
wsd 0.077 3.412 0.083 wsd 0.022 1.103 0.071
child 0.013 1.004 0.358 child 0.011 0.992 0.411
govt 0.132 6.446 0.155 govt 0.073 3.999 0.296
metro 0.115 9.486 0.739 metro 0.067 6.390 0.742
affh -0.470 -9.500 0.029 affh -0.286 -5.349 0.013
mining 0.149 2.236 0.006 mining 0.231 3.454 0.006
manufact 0.028 1.427 0.237 manufact -0.017 -0.959 0.251
elecgw 0.164 4.084 0.013 elecgw 0.074 2.319 0.031
constrn -0.050 -1.961 0.090 constrn 0.055 2.372 0.062
rt -0.156 -6.624 0.108 rt -0.124 -5.740 0.101
rest -0.186 -5.063 0.024 rest -0.124 -3.617 0.021
transtre 0.034 1.215 0.049 transtre -0.038 -1.535 0.060
communic 0.022 0.590 0.033 communic -0.047 -1.537 0.037
fin 0.192 5.998 0.042 fin 0.125 4.542 0.048
pbs 0.066 2.646 0.098 pbs 0.007 0.245 0.054
pad -0.099 -3.136 0.049 pad -0.091 -3.293 0.077
ed -0.210 -6.752 0.050 ed -0.179 -6.157 0.066
hellwel -0.058 -1.750 0.037 hellwel -0.138 -3.954 0.041
ent -0.017 -0.327 0.017 ent -0.091 -1.851 0.012
pos -0.055 -1.509 0.030 pos 0.020 0.647 0.034
mgr 0.315 6.998 0.162 mgr 0.247 8.427 0.134
prof 0.258 5.673 0.139 prof 0.149 5.092 0.126
aspro 0.177 4.034 0.135 aspro 0.077 2.834 0.110
trade 0.017 0.377 0.217 trade -0.152 -5.604 0.226
icssw 0.100 2.278 0.097 icssw 0.003 0.111 0.112
iptw 0.005 0.106 0.126 iptw -0.108 -3.785 0.116
ecssw -0.065 -1.312 0.032 ecssw -0.155 -4.110 0.023
lrw -0.044 -0.956 0.082 lrw -0.186 -6.728 0.129
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VICTORIAN FEMALES - 1996 VICTORIAN FEMALES - 1991 
Mean of ln(Y) 6.274 Mean of ln(Y) 6.112 
Adjusted R2 0.398 Adjusted R2 0.495 
Number of 
Observations 
3550 Number of 
Observations 
3086 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X 
--------- ------------- ---------- ------------ --------- ------------- ---------- ------------ 
constant 5.819 150.378 constant 5.726 186.375 
hschool 0.045 2.301 0.419 hschool 0.052 3.290 0.452
cert 0.106 4.360 0.125 cert 0.142 6.523 0.100
diploma 0.214 6.984 0.061 diploma 0.214 7.708 0.089
degree 0.293 10.788 0.255 degree 0.312 12.217 0.187
exp 0.035 16.551 17.320 exp 0.033 17.572 15.640
expsq -0.001 -14.504 431.140 expsq -0.001 -14.599 373.190
otime 0.120 8.119 0.320 otime 0.080 5.619 0.206
esb 0.030 1.200 0.074 esb -0.016 -0.891 0.096
nesb -0.052 -2.829 0.183 nesb -0.041 -2.566 0.154
married -0.007 -0.402 0.472 married 0.033 2.519 0.485
wsd 0.030 1.376 0.138 wsd 0.042 2.183 0.118
child -0.100 -5.443 0.221 child -0.082 -6.124 0.273
govt 0.068 3.551 0.190 govt 0.060 4.242 0.317
metro 0.107 6.950 0.790 metro 0.053 4.246 0.784
affh -0.323 -4.868 0.016 affh -0.371 -3.222 0.008
mining 0.162 2.915 0.002 mining 0.116 2.108 0.001
manufact -0.035 -1.313 0.151 manufact -0.032 -1.383 0.154
elecgw 0.185 1.925 0.003 elecgw 0.004 0.084 0.008
constrn -0.111 -1.897 0.012 constrn -0.014 -0.242 0.010
rt -0.117 -3.764 0.103 rt -0.178 -7.284 0.117
rest -0.186 -3.546 0.028 rest -0.124 -2.810 0.027
transtre -0.015 -0.382 0.029 transtre 0.058 1.710 0.026
communic 0.061 1.411 0.023 communic -0.065 -1.625 0.016
fin 0.076 2.702 0.076 fin 0.009 0.384 0.093
pbs 0.017 0.622 0.124 pbs -0.003 -0.104 0.074
pad -0.048 -1.184 0.039 pad -0.084 -2.613 0.052
ed -0.161 -5.685 0.125 ed -0.122 -4.497 0.137
hellwel -0.141 -5.068 0.148 hellwel -0.070 -2.677 0.158
ent -0.068 -1.369 0.023 ent -0.108 -1.719 0.015
pos -0.158 -3.604 0.036 pos -0.064 -2.082 0.039
mgr 0.205 6.569 0.081 mgr 0.258 8.297 0.056
prof 0.166 7.028 0.239 prof 0.159 7.263 0.228
aspro 0.009 0.370 0.132 aspro 0.065 2.737 0.066
trade -0.226 -5.659 0.034 trade -0.202 -6.180 0.034
icssw -0.103 -5.671 0.236 icssw -0.034 -2.039 0.204
iptw -0.252 -7.308 0.043 iptw -0.284 -9.788 0.044
ecssw -0.169 -5.363 0.071 ecssw -0.095 -5.093 0.136
lrw -0.165 -5.888 0.064 lrw -0.246 -10.151 0.083
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QLD - MALES - 1996  QLD - MALES - 1991  
Mean of ln(Y) 6.411 Mean of ln(Y) 6.212 
Adjusted R2 0.412 Adjusted R2 0.476 
Number of 
Observations 
4833 Number of 
Observations 
3676 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X 
--------- ------------- ---------- ------------ --------- ------------- ---------- ------------ 
constant 5.728 76.850 constant 5.659 140.292 
hschool 0.057 3.056 0.286 hschool 0.052 3.064 0.284
cert 0.126 6.818 0.336 cert 0.160 10.206 0.323
diploma 0.192 4.283 0.022 diploma 0.312 8.080 0.026
degree 0.347 11.192 0.145 degree 0.383 12.642 0.102
exp 0.033 14.133 19.789 exp 0.032 14.861 18.849
expsq -0.001 -11.970 527.790 expsq -0.001 -12.250 499.190
otime 0.166 13.593 0.515 otime 0.143 11.560 0.391
esb 0.022 1.241 0.116 esb 0.019 1.061 0.112
nesb -0.069 -2.593 0.078 nesb -0.050 -2.006 0.066
married 0.093 5.231 0.604 married 0.071 4.343 0.594
wsd 0.032 1.283 0.085 wsd 0.021 0.798 0.088
child 0.002 0.154 0.341 child 0.040 3.082 0.395
govt 0.112 5.716 0.219 govt 0.039 2.016 0.314
metro 0.026 2.111 0.478 metro 0.008 0.707 0.473
affh -0.277 -6.535 0.044 affh -0.280 -6.450 0.039
mining 0.663 16.119 0.038 mining 0.471 12.608 0.038
manufact 0.006 0.271 0.173 manufact 0.012 0.552 0.180
elecgw 0.095 1.820 0.014 elecgw 0.041 1.043 0.020
constrn 0.027 1.016 0.102 constrn 0.034 1.312 0.097
rt -0.127 -4.820 0.100 rt -0.120 -4.941 0.096
rest -0.238 -6.050 0.036 rest -0.107 -2.550 0.033
transtre 0.057 1.770 0.062 transtre 0.062 1.888 0.075
communic 0.078 2.137 0.022 communic 0.035 1.009 0.029
fin 0.238 5.239 0.026 fin 0.158 4.221 0.035
pbs -0.003 -0.087 0.090 pbs 0.011 0.320 0.043
pad -0.059 -1.841 0.071 pad 0.035 1.171 0.088
ed -0.177 -5.283 0.044 ed -0.155 -4.627 0.059
hellwel 0.031 0.731 0.040 hellwel -0.078 -2.059 0.039
ent -0.028 -0.584 0.018 ent -0.041 -0.570 0.013
pos -0.098 -2.331 0.031 pos 0.005 0.147 0.036
mgr 0.270 3.761 0.146 mgr 0.208 5.905 0.106
prof 0.227 3.108 0.107 prof 0.150 4.153 0.088
aspro 0.153 2.180 0.130 aspro 0.096 3.087 0.115
trade -0.015 -0.217 0.237 trade -0.092 -2.883 0.236
icssw 0.039 0.545 0.093 icssw 0.002 0.050 0.113
iptw -0.029 -0.404 0.139 iptw -0.102 -3.150 0.132
ecssw -0.023 -0.305 0.034 ecssw -0.079 -1.662 0.021
lrw -0.082 -1.143 0.104 lrw -0.164 -5.058 0.156
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QUEENSLAND FEMALES - 1996 QUEENSLAND FEMALES - 1991 
Mean of ln(Y) 6.198 Mean of ln(Y) 5.999 
Adjusted R2 0.367 Adjusted R2 0.481 
Number of 
Observations 
2530 Number of 
Observations 
1870 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X 
--------- ------------- ---------- ------------ --------- ------------- ---------- ------------ 
constant 5.710 115.859 constant 5.489 123.855 
hschool 0.075 3.397 0.366 hschool 0.088 4.838 0.379
cert 0.113 4.135 0.126 cert 0.135 5.003 0.102
diploma 0.189 5.079 0.057 diploma 0.248 7.620 0.110
degree 0.345 11.189 0.206 degree 0.379 10.471 0.122
exp 0.032 11.365 17.600 exp 0.042 15.250 15.297
expsq -0.001 -9.713 448.980 expsq -0.001 -12.939 362.450
otime 0.087 5.119 0.331 otime 0.096 4.737 0.209
esb 0.034 1.346 0.108 esb -0.019 -0.786 0.104
nesb -0.056 -1.723 0.074 nesb -0.041 -1.275 0.044
married 0.042 2.338 0.475 married 0.022 1.387 0.458
wsd 0.008 0.315 0.142 wsd 0.058 2.498 0.131
child -0.064 -3.053 0.211 child -0.110 -5.912 0.262
govt 0.112 5.741 0.245 govt 0.127 6.663 0.329
metro 0.067 4.489 0.532 metro 0.045 3.248 0.551
affh -0.179 -2.487 0.025 affh -0.366 -2.433 0.008
mining 0.293 2.051 0.006 mining 0.461 4.573 0.004
manufact 0.079 2.059 0.081 manufact 0.001 0.018 0.085
elecgw 0.183 3.625 0.003 elecgw 0.048 0.516 0.005
constrn 0.081 1.083 0.016 constrn -0.002 -0.021 0.014
rt -0.036 -0.836 0.128 rt -0.088 -2.350 0.160
rest -0.013 -0.261 0.055 rest -0.017 -0.341 0.047
transtre 0.196 3.779 0.034 transtre 0.002 0.038 0.029
communic 0.107 1.647 0.017 communic 0.080 1.538 0.010
fin 0.145 3.709 0.057 fin 0.106 2.638 0.070
pbs 0.060 1.432 0.115 pbs 0.024 0.557 0.081
pad 0.080 1.760 0.060 pad -0.039 -0.877 0.067
ed -0.046 -1.117 0.105 ed -0.082 -1.867 0.123
hellwel -0.006 -0.151 0.186 hellwel -0.099 -2.403 0.190
ent 0.011 0.157 0.024 ent 0.101 1.517 0.016
pos -0.072 -1.245 0.043 pos -0.012 -0.255 0.049
mgr 0.196 4.290 0.068 mgr 0.176 3.642 0.033
prof 0.136 4.082 0.218 prof 0.178 5.807 0.207
aspro 0.011 0.344 0.143 aspro 0.072 2.030 0.068
trade -0.190 -3.398 0.030 trade -0.168 -3.728 0.033
icssw -0.108 -4.497 0.275 icssw -0.011 -0.528 0.238
iptw -0.222 -5.809 0.029 iptw -0.154 -2.346 0.017
ecssw -0.092 -2.406 0.081 ecssw -0.054 -2.254 0.141
lrw -0.248 -6.644 0.066 lrw -0.102 -3.500 0.093
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ADEL - MALES - 1996 ADEL - MALES - 1991 
Mean of ln(Y) 6.407 Mean of ln(Y) 6.264 
Adjusted R2 0.445 Adjusted R2 0.527 
Number of 
Observations 
1502 Number of 
Observations 
1371 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X 
--------- ------------- ---------- ------------ --------- ------------- ---------- ------------ 
constant 5.785 67.584 constant 5.671 82.505 
hschool 0.091 2.848 0.358 hschool 0.092 3.285 0.344
cert 0.198 5.943 0.314 cert 0.172 5.626 0.307
diploma 0.234 2.744 0.029 diploma 0.220 3.887 0.042
degree 0.434 9.254 0.156 degree 0.475 10.168 0.141
exp 0.032 7.660 19.615 exp 0.036 10.173 19.105
expsq -0.001 -5.727 507.420 expsq -0.001 -9.012 508.830
otime 0.203 10.434 0.452 otime 0.160 8.412 0.372
esb -0.044 -1.613 0.142 esb 0.002 0.088 0.195
nesb -0.143 -4.451 0.129 nesb -0.044 -1.523 0.108
married 0.083 3.211 0.580 married 0.080 2.862 0.615
wsd -0.002 -0.064 0.098 wsd -0.027 -0.599 0.089
child 0.015 0.590 0.346 child 0.019 0.852 0.387
govt 0.114 3.479 0.214 govt 0.071 2.458 0.300
affh -0.219 -2.437 0.009 affh -0.317 -2.420 0.009
mining 0.538 4.098 0.003 mining 0.212 1.283 0.007
manufact -0.037 -1.013 0.249 manufact 0.017 0.519 0.271
elecgw -0.130 -1.757 0.011 elecgw 0.015 0.323 0.028
constrn -0.060 -1.230 0.067 constrn 0.037 0.778 0.062
rt -0.140 -3.199 0.105 rt -0.111 -2.637 0.092
rest -0.145 -1.820 0.026 rest 0.008 0.153 0.026
transtre -0.006 -0.106 0.054 transtre 0.042 0.796 0.053
communic 0.074 1.212 0.035 communic 0.032 0.563 0.028
fin 0.179 2.993 0.042 fin 0.077 1.275 0.053
pbs 0.031 0.573 0.089 pbs 0.013 0.222 0.047
pad -0.028 -0.515 0.053 pad -0.009 -0.195 0.079
ed -0.198 -3.783 0.057 ed -0.103 -1.970 0.067
hellwel -0.041 -0.657 0.050 hellwel -0.101 -1.622 0.045
ent 0.032 0.473 0.027 ent 0.115 1.058 0.007
pos -0.084 -1.354 0.038 pos 0.007 0.108 0.035
mgr 0.147 1.945 0.140 mgr 0.164 2.917 0.134
prof 0.151 1.976 0.135 prof 0.089 1.709 0.131
aspro -0.007 -0.098 0.134 aspro -0.013 -0.261 0.102
trade -0.062 -0.865 0.227 trade -0.161 -3.185 0.228
icssw -0.018 -0.246 0.111 icssw -0.028 -0.528 0.129
iptw -0.114 -1.524 0.129 iptw -0.154 -2.730 0.111
ecssw -0.143 -1.480 0.032 ecssw -0.140 -1.651 0.024
lrw -0.116 -1.548 0.083 lrw -0.257 -4.730 0.109
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ADELAIDE FEMALES  - 1996  ADELAIDE FEMALES  - 1991  
Mean of ln(Y) 6.249 Mean of ln(Y) 6.079 
Adjusted R2 0.379 Adjusted R2 0.505 
Number of 
Observations 
772 Number of 
Observations 
779 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X 
--------- ------------- ---------- ------------ --------- ------------- ---------- ------------ 
constant 5.868 79.937 constant 5.654 102.780 
hschool 0.046 1.246 0.403 hschool 0.093 3.255 0.465
cert 0.026 0.521 0.133 cert 0.153 4.218 0.127
diploma 0.180 3.298 0.075 diploma 0.313 5.709 0.089
degree 0.253 4.866 0.237 degree 0.402 9.015 0.134
exp 0.024 5.808 18.030 exp 0.031 8.453 16.022
expsq 0.000 -4.826 448.910 expsq -0.001 -6.852 383.160
otime 0.131 4.738 0.286 otime 0.097 3.850 0.202
esb 0.034 1.041 0.131 esb 0.046 1.853 0.166
nesb -0.114 -2.287 0.104 nesb -0.007 -0.188 0.072
married 0.023 0.790 0.473 married 0.032 1.258 0.471
wsd -0.008 -0.202 0.148 wsd 0.062 1.919 0.134
child -0.011 -0.347 0.183 child -0.050 -1.947 0.259
govt 0.145 4.440 0.298 govt 0.056 2.470 0.363
affh 0.010 0.091 0.006 affh -0.197 -2.354 0.005
mining 0.000 0.000 0.000 mining 0.000 0.000 0.000
manufact 0.051 0.940 0.120 manufact -0.039 -0.813 0.145
elecgw -0.043 -0.693 0.003 elecgw -0.014 -0.144 0.012
constrn 0.169 1.180 0.003 constrn 0.057 0.906 0.019
rt -0.049 -0.732 0.106 rt -0.178 -4.030 0.119
rest -0.133 -1.593 0.035 rest 0.019 0.259 0.019
transtre 0.132 2.017 0.035 transtre -0.048 -0.440 0.022
communic 0.028 0.226 0.014 communic -0.178 -3.151 0.015
fin 0.082 1.247 0.062 fin -0.010 -0.227 0.099
pbs 0.058 0.931 0.106 pbs -0.062 -1.112 0.063
pad 0.031 0.417 0.047 pad -0.066 -1.166 0.073
ed -0.152 -2.236 0.139 ed -0.122 -2.427 0.119
hellwel -0.064 -1.142 0.190 hellwel -0.141 -3.206 0.190
ent -0.102 -0.866 0.028 ent -0.312 -2.944 0.009
pos -0.056 -0.863 0.039 pos -0.126 -2.061 0.049
mgr 0.129 2.212 0.070 mgr 0.298 4.578 0.039
prof 0.166 3.398 0.273 prof 0.161 3.863 0.211
aspro -0.009 -0.184 0.113 aspro 0.095 2.085 0.055
trade -0.209 -3.042 0.023 trade -0.033 -0.578 0.042
icssw -0.061 -1.577 0.276 icssw 0.016 0.515 0.223
iptw -0.087 -1.413 0.041 iptw -0.165 -2.649 0.033
ecssw -0.101 -1.636 0.053 ecssw -0.024 -0.779 0.141
lrw -0.231 -3.871 0.063 lrw -0.175 -3.593 0.081
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perth - males - 1996  perth - males - 1991  
Mean of ln(Y) 6.492 Mean of ln(Y) 6.301 
Adjusted R2 0.434 Adjusted R2 0.557 
Number of 
Observations 
1890 Number of 
Observations 
1399 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X 
--------- ------------- ---------- ------------ --------- ------------- ---------- ------------ 
constant 5.801 79.982 constant 5.610 82.792 
hschool 0.041 1.421 0.286 hschool 0.046 1.765 0.276
cert 0.095 3.340 0.323 cert 0.174 6.995 0.288
diploma 0.038 0.720 0.041 diploma 0.236 5.754 0.059
degree 0.256 6.300 0.187 degree 0.483 12.150 0.148
exp 0.039 10.813 20.025 exp 0.034 10.486 18.769
expsq -0.001 -8.912 536.870 expsq -0.001 -9.016 488.660
otime 0.178 9.135 0.490 otime 0.144 7.656 0.395
esb -0.032 -1.378 0.220 esb -0.058 -2.813 0.249
nesb -0.031 -0.992 0.147 nesb -0.121 -4.343 0.127
married 0.132 4.472 0.599 married 0.141 5.067 0.602
wsd 0.077 2.009 0.087 wsd 0.047 1.421 0.084
child 0.017 0.693 0.349 child -0.022 -1.013 0.397
govt 0.067 2.141 0.193 govt 0.016 0.537 0.304
affh -0.244 -2.550 0.007 affh -0.087 -0.813 0.007
mining 0.355 4.307 0.028 mining 0.282 5.438 0.024
manufact -0.080 -2.223 0.192 manufact -0.002 -0.067 0.192
elecgw 0.027 0.347 0.015 elecgw 0.001 0.018 0.024
constrn 0.032 0.770 0.111 constrn 0.012 0.240 0.078
rt -0.155 -3.552 0.105 rt -0.113 -3.082 0.118
rest -0.209 -3.953 0.023 rest -0.029 -0.417 0.024
transtre 0.039 0.723 0.058 transtre 0.085 1.810 0.066
communic 0.030 0.478 0.025 communic 0.004 0.089 0.036
fin 0.122 2.080 0.035 fin 0.112 2.490 0.044
pbs -0.004 -0.091 0.111 pbs -0.026 -0.442 0.057
pad -0.057 -0.994 0.045 pad 0.021 0.420 0.070
ed -0.145 -2.754 0.062 ed -0.185 -3.353 0.055
hellwel -0.144 -2.347 0.046 hellwel -0.022 -0.340 0.038
ent 0.000 -0.004 0.016 ent 0.063 0.785 0.016
pos -0.146 -2.430 0.032 pos 0.033 0.693 0.056
mgr 0.273 4.326 0.143 mgr 0.328 5.588 0.129
prof 0.268 4.197 0.137 prof 0.187 3.317 0.122
aspro 0.141 2.416 0.141 aspro 0.164 3.058 0.132
trade -0.052 -0.870 0.234 trade -0.041 -0.706 0.212
icssw 0.032 0.527 0.107 icssw 0.076 1.337 0.134
iptw -0.076 -1.196 0.118 iptw 0.047 0.797 0.089
ecssw -0.046 -0.593 0.031 ecssw 0.024 0.404 0.030
lrw -0.151 -2.352 0.078 lrw -0.054 -0.941 0.122
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PERTH FEMALES  - 1996 PERTH FEMALES  - 1991 
Mean of ln(Y) 6.257 Mean of ln(Y) 6.077 
Adjusted R2 0.438 Adjusted R2 0.549 
Number of 
Observations 
1037 Number of 
Observations 
777 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean of X 
--------- ------------- ---------- ------------ --------- ------------- ---------- ------------ 
constant 5.801 84.456 constant 5.517 97.117 
hschool 0.067 2.322 0.355 hschool 0.064 2.492 0.360
cert 0.065 1.676 0.142 cert 0.128 3.829 0.139
diploma 0.157 2.717 0.071 diploma 0.236 5.111 0.107
degree 0.257 5.817 0.231 degree 0.320 5.862 0.161
exp 0.040 10.382 18.006 exp 0.040 10.893 16.447
expsq -0.001 -8.341 456.550 expsq -0.001 -8.877 406.580
otime 0.066 2.683 0.289 otime 0.158 6.380 0.212
esb -0.027 -1.130 0.201 esb 0.016 0.705 0.229
nesb -0.074 -2.057 0.124 nesb -0.018 -0.571 0.125
married 0.012 0.464 0.442 married 0.013 0.483 0.449
wsd -0.034 -0.983 0.182 wsd 0.025 0.835 0.134
child -0.065 -2.159 0.200 child -0.062 -2.446 0.251
govt 0.063 2.211 0.265 govt 0.076 2.356 0.327
affh -0.216 -2.046 0.007 affh 0.134 1.996 0.001
mining 0.219 2.125 0.009 mining 0.280 2.090 0.009
manufact 0.095 1.540 0.068 manufact 0.028 0.573 0.089
elecgw 0.004 0.051 0.001 elecgw 0.258 1.577 0.004
constrn 0.097 0.981 0.017 constrn 0.277 2.769 0.014
rt -0.127 -2.027 0.115 rt -0.059 -1.171 0.124
rest -0.113 -1.700 0.042 rest 0.068 1.015 0.032
transtre 0.046 0.620 0.030 transtre 0.065 0.836 0.026
communic 0.075 0.823 0.017 communic -0.155 -0.795 0.009
fin 0.087 1.499 0.082 fin 0.103 2.233 0.106
pbs 0.032 0.557 0.130 pbs 0.057 1.161 0.102
pad 0.068 0.961 0.052 pad 0.053 0.869 0.060
ed -0.183 -2.844 0.123 ed -0.008 -0.127 0.121
hellwel -0.153 -2.528 0.182 hellwel 0.064 1.108 0.181
ent 0.061 0.717 0.024 ent -0.028 -0.177 0.013
pos -0.033 -0.492 0.041 pos -0.115 -1.579 0.053
mgr 0.209 3.462 0.071 mgr 0.341 4.604 0.028
prof 0.235 4.872 0.225 prof 0.124 3.006 0.220
aspro 0.061 1.514 0.131 aspro 0.069 1.991 0.093
trade -0.164 -2.520 0.032 trade -0.172 -2.670 0.045
icssw -0.111 -3.220 0.274 icssw 0.003 0.099 0.216
iptw -0.156 -1.585 0.025 iptw -0.345 -2.444 0.014
ecssw -0.124 -2.487 0.082 ecssw -0.103 -3.152 0.127
lrw -0.286 -4.953 0.055 lrw -0.244 -5.072 0.071
     
     
     
 
  
 
 
